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Gattis: Judgment and Sentence in a Florida Criminal Case

NOTES
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE IN A FLORIDA
CRIMINAL CASE
JUDGMMT

The term "judgment," as used in criminal law, is defined by Florida statute as "the adjudication by the court that the defendant is
guilty or not guilty."1 It should be noted that the concept of judgment is distinct from that of sentence. The sentence is defined as
"the pronouncement by the court of the penalty imposed on the defendant ... .-"2 To understand correctly the role of the judgment, the
judgment and the sentence must be thought of as separate procedures.
Adjudication of Guilt
Most jurisdictions do not require an express finding of guilt if it is
apparent from the record that the court found the defendant guilty.3
However, a more strict rule has been adopted in Florida where the
judgment must contain an adjudication by the court of the guilt of
the defendant.4 If a judgment lacks the requisite adjudication of
guilt, it is considered defective and invalid.5
There is, however, an early decision which maintains that on the
acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere it is not necessary to have an
adjudication of guilt, "for that follows as a legal inference from the
implied confession in the plea ..
."6 Nevertheless, the opinion continued by stating that "the court should adjudge that the defendant is
convicted of the offense charged... ."T Adjudging the defendant
"convicted" may have the effect of requiring an adjudication of guilt,
since, as will be discussed below, a conviction requires an adjudication of guilt. If the question concerning an adjudication of guilt on a

1. FLA. STAT. §921.01 (1961).

2. FLA. STAT. §921.05 (1961).
3.

Annot., 69 A.L.R. 792 (1930).

4. Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930); Kuhn v. State, 98 Fla.
206, 123 So. 755 (1929); Burns v. State, 97 Fla. 232, 120 So. 360 (1929).
5. Ibid.
6. Pensacola Lodge No. 497, B.P.O.E. v. State, 74 Fla. 498, 500, 77 So. 613,
614 (1917).
7. Ibid.
[312 ]
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plea of nolo contendere ever comes before the court again, it will
probably hold that such an adjudication is necessary. This position is
supported by cases to be discussed later in which the court requires a
proper adjudication even where the plea is one of guilty.
Conviction
From an examination of the cases in this area, it is clear that a conviction amounts to more than a jury verdict of guilt. In an early case
the Florida Supreme Court held contrary to decisions in other jurisdictions and stated that "this court is firmly committed to the doctrine that a legal conviction of crime includes a judgment of the court
as well as a plea or verdict of guilty."s
In the recent case of Gordon v. State,9 two of the State's witnesses,
who were also defendants, entered pleas of guilty to perjury before
their trial, but were not adjudged guilty. At the trial both witnesses
were allowed to testify against a third defendant. On appeal, this defendant took the position that by entering a plea of guilty a witness
stands convicted, and thus becomes incompetent to testify under
Florida statute.1 0 In other words, he contended that a plea of guilty
is tantamount to conviction. This contention was rejected by the
court, holding that "a person is not rendered incompetent to testify at
a trial until he has been convicted of perjury and, until he is adjudicated guilty of said crime, he does not stand convicted.. . ."" Thus,
in Florida a finding of guilt must be followed by the court's pronouncement of judgment (adjudication of guilt) before there can be
a conviction.
Probation
The Florida probation statutes, as amended in 1959, provide an
exception to the general principle requiring an adjudication of guilt in
all cases in which guilt has been established. This 1959 amendment permits the trial courts to place a defendant on probation either
with or without an adjudication of guilt, excepting offenses punishable
by death. 1 2 Therefore, under this statute a defendant may be
placed on probation without having been adjudicated guilty and
hence without having been convicted of the crime charged.' 3
8. Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 29, 129 So. 106, 108 (1980).
9. 119 So. 2d 753 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
10. FLA. STAT. §90.07 (1961).
11. Gordon v. State, supra note 9, at 757.
12. FLA.STAT. §948.01(1) (1961).
13. Gordon v. State, supra note 9.
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When a defendant is placed on probation without having been
convicted, several important consequences follow that are often favorable to the defendant.
A prior conviction is a necessary predicate for the operation of the
habitual offender statutes. 14 Consequently, a defendant who is
placed on probation for his first offense, without having been adjudicated guilty, will not be subject to the habitual offender laws when he
is convicted for a second offense.
By placing a defendant on probation without adjudicating him
guilty, a trial judge may also preserve the defendant's civil rights
which would have been lost had he been convicted.' 5
On the other hand, when a pardon is desired the defendant would
prefer to have had his guilt adjudicated, because a pardon may be
granted only after a conviction."6
Improper Judgment
A judgment improperly rendered may be challenged on appeal 7
through habeas corpus' s or by the Florida Supreme Court's own motion.' 9 In regard to the latter challenge, the court maintained in
Ellis v. State2 0 that even though the judgment was not assigned as
error, they would review it when a fundamental error appeared in
the record.
When the judgment is found by an appellate court to have been
improperly rendered by the trial court, the remedy is simple. In a
habeas corpus proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court held that 2 '
[T]he proper disposition to be made of the prisoner is to remand him to the appropriate court of first instance to be resentenced in due and legal form, after the entry of a proper judgment adjudicating the defendant's guilt of the precise crime for
which the sentence of the law is authorized to be imposed.
Sufficiency of the Judgment
The Florida Supreme Court has held that a judgment must be a
"clear, positive, and definite adjudication by the court of the defend14. FLA. STAT. ch. 775 (1961).
15. FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§4-5. See Note Criminals" Loss of Civil Rights,
in this Symposium.
16. FLA.CONsT. art. IV, §12.
17. Cautn v. State, 98 Fla. 185, 122 So. 565 (1929).
18. Ex parte Ferris, 111 Fla. 584, 149 So. 580 (1933).
19. Lewis v. State, 154 Fla. 825, 19 So. 2d 199 (1944).
20. Supra note 4.
21. Ex parte Ferris, supra note 18, at 585, 149 So. at 581.
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ant's guilt . . *22 The court continued by saying that "a judgment
in substance should show directly and not inferentially the judicial
character of the act, the nature and scope of the adjudication, and
its application to the controversy before the court."2 3
In Hambrick v. State24 the pertinent part of the judgment recited that the defendant was guilty of having "carnal intercourse with
an unmarried female under the age of 18 years." The Florida Supreme Court held that omission of the words "of previous chaste character" from the recital of judgment did not vitiate the judgment, but
that the entire record may be looked to in ascertaining the offense.
Subsequent cases have taken an opposite view, however, and have
held that the offense, if stated, must be stated exactly and accurately.
In Lewis v. Mayo25 the defendant was adjudged guilty of "breaking and entering." The judgment was held defective in that it did
not include the words "breaking and entering dwelling, with intent to
commit felony of rape," as charged in the indictment. In a similar
case the information charged that the defendant did "unlawfully
have, receive and aid in the concealment of 2 cases of hats. ....26
Judgment convicting defendant of possessing stolen property was
held inadequate, because it did not state that the accused was guilty
of possession of stolen property under conditions which make such
having, receiving, and concealing a criminal offense.
A related problem concerns an offense recited in the judgment,
but which is different or greater than that contained in the verdict.
Such a case is Holloman v. State,27 in which the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter, but the court pronounced judgment for murder
in the second degree. This judgment was held to be error and the
case remanded so that the judgment could be stated in conformity
with the verdict. In Walden v. State28 the jury found the defendant
guilty of "breaking and entering a store building with intent to commit a misdemeanor therein... ." The court adjudged the defendant
guilty of burglary. This case was also remanded for proper adjudicalion of guilt. On the basis of these two cases, the rule has been established that the judgment of the trial court in a criminal case must
conform to the verdict of the jury.

22. Harris v. State, 75 Fla. 527, 528, 78 So. 526, 527 (1918).

23. ibid.
24. 80 Fla. 672, 86 So. 623 (1920).
25. 127 Fla. 488, 173 So. 346 (1937).
26. Perkins v. State, 126 Fla. 707, 171 So. 655 (1936).

27. 140 Fla. 59, 191 So. 36 (1939).
28. 83 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1955).
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Correct Formula
The Florida Supreme Court in Mathis v. State2 9 expressly rejected
a verdict of the jury as insufficient for a valid judgment and continued
by saying that a correct formula for a judgment would be substan30
tially as follows:
Now on this day came in person the defendants ... [A,

B, and C] with their counsel into open court, and each of them
being separately asked by the court whether he or they had
anything to say why sentence of the law should not now be
pronounced upon him, say nothing. It is therefore the judgment, order, and sentence of the court that you ... [A, B,
and C] and each of you, for the crime of which you have been
and stand convicted, be imprisoned in the state penitentiary of
the State of Florida for a period of two years from the date of
your delivery to the officers thereof.
Cases in this area disclose one shortcoming in the above proposed
formula for a judgment. In regard to the provision "for the crime of
which you have been and stand convicted," the court, in Ellis v. State,
suggested that "it might be better for the judgment to specifically set
1
forth the offense by name."3
Rendition of The Judgment

A Florida statute requires that the judgment "be rendered in open
court and entered on the minutes of the court."32 This statute has
been extended by the Florida Supreme Court to the effect that "a
clerk of a court is not authorized to issue a commitment except when
the minutes of the court show the record of a conviction and sentence
of the accused."33 Continuing, the court held that the commitment
order is void "unless there appears upon the minutes of such court the
record of the judgment of conviction. . .. 34

29. 67 Fla. 277, 64 So. 944 (1914).
80. Id. at 278, 64 So. at 944.
31. 100 Fla. 27, 34, 129 So. 106, 109 (1930).
32. FLA.STAT. §921.02 (1961).
33. Wade v. Coniers, 92 Fla. 494, 496, 109 So. 453, 454 (1926).
34. Ibid. Mr. Freeman advances a contrary view. According to this author,
the rendition of the judgment is a judicial act, while its entry upon the record

is ministerial. He states that a "judgment is not what is entered, but what is
ordered and considered." His conclusion is that the failure of the clerk to enter
a judgment in the minutes does not deprive such judgment of its legal effect.
1 H mAN, JuDGEuNTs §46 (5th ed. 1925).
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In State v. Bird the court maintained that3 5
While in a sense a judgment or ruling is rendered when it
is orally announced by the presiding judge, yet until such order
or judgment is entered of record, there is not competent evidence of its rendition, at least such as will support an appeal.
In Bass v. Doolittle36 the court relaxed the above rule for a county
judge's court by holding that in such courts the judgment should be
entered in the record book, but that it was not absolutely necessary.
The Florida Supreme Court maintained that in a county judge's court
"the judgment should be construed in connection with and with reference to the charge contained in the affidavit and the proceedings had
thereon." 37
From Florida statute and case law the rule appears established,
except for county judge's courts, that a mere oral pronouncement of
judgment, without an entry thereof in the records, is insufficient to
constitute a conclusive judgment.
Purpose of the Judgment
Since the pronouncement of judgment is not discretionary, in fact
often appearing to be a mere formality, one might ask why a court
should not be allowed to impose sentence immediately following the
verdict of the jury, thus eliminating the judgment
In the Ellis case, the court takes the following approach to this
possibility. The jury's duty is to determine the facts, thus serving as
an arm of the court, while the court speaks only through its presiding
judge. "It is the judgment of the court adopting the findings of the
jury which breathes life and effectiveness into the jury's verdict."3 8
In other words, the jury's verdict is made effective only by the judgment of the court. It was stated in Jarvis v. Chapman39 that the judgment is the pronouncement by the court of its conclusions and decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication. There is a distinction between the findings of a jury and the conclusion of a court.
The former is "nothing more than an order for a judgment,"04 while
the latter "concludes the subject on which it is rendered, and pro-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

128 Fla. 552, 556, 175 So. 858, 859 (1937).
93 Fla. 993, 112 So. 892 (1927).
Id. at 999, 112 So. at 894.
Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 37, 129 So. 106, 110 (1930).
118 Fla. 577, 159 So. 282 (1934).
1 FREEMAN, JuDGTMNTs §3 (5th ed. 1925).
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of the Florida Sunounces the law of the case." 41 Justice 4Terrell
2
preme Court has written that a judgment is
The court's finding or decision of the issues on which the case
is brought to this court It is the evidence of the court's finding as to the issues and is essential to point this out and put the
world on notice as to what the court did with the issues.
The purpose of a judgment is to give the court's authority to the jury
verdict and to bring finality to the proceeding.
Even though an elimination of the judgment might prove to be
more efficient, it would entail depriving the defendant of a valuable
safeguard. If the judgment were eliminated, a judge could conceivably impose sentence for an offense greater or different than the one
committed or for one not committed at all. Maintaining the judgment provides a defendant with an additional protection that is not
outweighed by the expense and burden of litigation arising from improper judgments.
One recommendation would alleviate much of the problem concerning erroneous judgments. The Florida Supreme Court should
promulgate a standard judgment form to be used in all criminal
cases. Such a printed form would include the proper wording of a
judgment as accepted by the court, leaving blank spaces in which the
judge could place the defendant's name and the offense committed.
If this recommendation were accepted, the defendant would not be
deprived of his safeguard and the courts would not be burdened with
remanded judgments.
SENTENCE

Sentence, as defined by Florida statute, is "the pronouncement by
the court of the penalty imposed on the defendant . . upon the acceptance of a plea of guilty, or upon a verdict or finding of guilt.48
The Florida Supreme Court has held that there must be a conviction
to support a sentence. 44 Therefore, a conviction does not include a
sentence and the sentence is not a "necessary ingredient" of a conviction, but "is simply the penalty for... misconduct."4 5
A sentence should be definite and certain so that it will advise the
defendant of commencement and termination dates without requiring reference to any of the other court records. 46 However, it is not
."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Ex parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 193, 202 (1830).
Letter From Justice Glenn Terrell to Donald L. Gattis, Oct. 80, 1962.
Fr.i STAT. §921.05 (1961).
Finch v. Mayo, 137 Fla. 762, 189 So. 27 (1939).
Weathers v. State, 56 So. 2d 536, 538 (Fla. 1952).
Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713 (1899).
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necessary for a sentence to contain
a recital of all the proceedings oc47
curring before its imposition.
Legal Sentence
Only one sentence is justified when only one violation has occurred, even though the violation may be stated under two counts in
the information.4 8 However, one information may be filed containing
two counts charging two distinct crimes, thereby justifying two sentences. 49 In Washington v. State ° the defendant was charged in one
information with separate counts of larceny and receiving stolen
goods. The verdict was a general one of guilty and the court stated
that the trial judge could have imposed sentences for each of the distinct offenses.
When a sentence has been properly imposed, the question arises
whether it is subject to modification on appeal. The Florida Supreme
Court has answered this question in the negative. In the recent
Davis v. State case,5 1 the defendant had been sentenced to death and
on appeal he sought to have the penalty reduced. The court refused
to alter the sentence and stated that "where a sentence is within the
statutory limit, the extent of it cannot be reviewed on appeal regardless of the existence or nonexistence of mitigating circumstances." 52
In an earlier opinion the court indicated that a defendant's only relief is before the parole authorities, and that it had no power to reduce or modify a lawfully imposed sentence of the lower court.58 In
essence, a trial court has complete discretion regarding the determination of a sentence, so long as it stays within the limitations pre54
scribed by the appropriate statute.
The Second District Court of Appeal has recently stated that a
sentence is not "cruel or unusual punishment" if it conforms to the
statute pertinent to the crime.5 5 The rationale of the court was that
47. Dicks v. State, 83 Fla. 717, 93 So. 137 (1922).

48. Mixon v. State, 54 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1951). Thus, when a defendant
was charged in a -fist
count for unlawfully conducting a lottery and in a second
count for unlawfully possessing lottery tickets, it was held that the information
charged only one violation of the lottery statute and that only one sentence
was Iustified.
49. Washington v. State, 51 Fla.137, 40 So. 765 (1906).
50. Ibid.
51. 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960).
52. Id. at 707.
53. Stanford v. State, 110 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1959).
54. Rohdin v. State, 105 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1958).
55. Cbavigny v. State, 112 So. 2d 910 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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the Florida constitutional prohibition 6 "refers to the statute fixing the
punishment and not to the punishment set by the court... ."57 Therefore, if the statute does not violate the constitution, any punishment
within the statutory bounds is permissible.
Presence of Defendant
Defendant's presence in court as a requirement for a valid sentence in a felony proceeding was established in 1892 by Brown v.
State.58 The court stated that the defendant's presence should be
clearly indicated in the record, although it acknowledged that it was
sufficient if his presence appeared by a reasonable implication. Today this situation is covered by Florida Statute 914.01, which requires
the defendant to be present at the rendition of the verdict in all
prosecutions for a felony. The statute does not expressly require the
defendant's presence in a misdemeanor proceeding, indicating that
his presence may not be necessary.
Allocution
Allocution, as required by Florida statute, 59 is the process by
which the court informs the defendant of the accusation and judgment against him and asks whether there is any reason why sentence
should not be pronounced. The basis of this rule stems from the possibility that there may be a valid cause for not pronouncing sentence.6 0
In Byrd v. State the court stated that the following recitation
would sufficiently comply with the Florida allocution statute: "Now
on this day came in person the defendant, John Byrd, and being
asked by the court whether he had anything to say why the sentence
of the law should not now be pronounced upon him, says nothing." 61
A problem arises when a defendant is tried, adjudicated guilty,
and properly sentenced, but the sentence is subsequently vacated
and the trial court again enters sentence for the identical offense, this
time without the allocution. These facts arose in Westberry v. Cochran6' 2 and the court remanded the case for imposition of sentence in
conformity with the allocution statute.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

of Rights, §8.
Chavigny v. State, supra note 55, at 915.
29 Fla. 548, 10 So. 736 (1892).
FLA. STAT. §921.07 (1961).
Thomas v. State, 74 Fla. 200, 76 So. 780 (1917).
146 Fla. 686, 1 So. 2d 624 (1941).
118 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1960).
FLA. CONST. Decl.
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Illegal Sentence
A sentence that imposes an excessive term of imprisonment is illegal and void. In Bascelio v. Mayo63 the defendant was sentenced to
ten years imprisonment for possession of narcotics in violation of Florida Statute 398.22, which limits first offenders to five years. The
Florida Supreme Court held that this sentence was clearly in excess of
that authorized by law and was void. Similarly, in Keeley v. Cochran 4 the defendant was sentenced for a term of six months to ten
years under a statute which provided a maximum penalty of five
years. The sentence was therefore excessive and defendant was remanded for the proper imposition of a new sentence.
Just as a sentence is illegal when excessive, so is a sentence illegal
which fails to impose punishment equivalent to the minimum provided by statute. In Dean v. State65 the defendant was convicted
of second-degree murder and sentenced for ten years, contrary to
Florida Statute 782.04 providing for imprisonment of not less than
tventy years. The court ruled the sentence "void on its face" since it
was for less than the minimum number of years prescribed by statute.
It is apparent that Florida is firmly committed to the rule requiring a
trial judge to sentence in conformity with the applicable statute, neither exceeding the maximum nor falling below the minimum.
A sentence is also illegally imposed if it is unauthorized by law.
The defendant in Franklinv. State66 was sentenced to pay a fine, and
upon failure to pay was sentenced to three years in the state prison.
However, a statute provided that on default of paying the fine a defendant would be imprisoned in the county jail. It was held on appeal that the trial court had no authority to sentence the defendant
to the state prison and since this sentence was unauthorized by law, it
was a nullity.
A sentence for a crime different than the one charged is void. In
Walden v. State6 7 the defendant was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. The trial court found
defendant guilty of burglary and sentenced him to ten years. This
sentence was reversed on appeal since the maximum sentence for the
breaking and entering charge was five years.
An improper adjudication of guilt will also result in an illegal sentence. The Florida Supreme Court held in Anderson v. Chapman
8
that
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

81 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1955).
121 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1960).
83 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1955).
120 Fla. 686, 163 So. 55 (1935).
83 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1955).
109 Fla. 54, 55, 146 So. 675, 676 (1933).
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The sentence was imposed by the court without any definite adjudication by the sentencing court of the guilt of the petitioner .. . [and] the court should remand the petitioner to
the court for a proper resentence after the entry of a judgment
adjudicating the prisoner's guilt.
Concurrent and Consecutive Sentences

Florida law in this area is governed by a single statute. 69 It states
that a defendant, convicted of two or more offenses charged in the
same information, will serve his sentences concurrently unless the
court directs them to be served consecutively, and that sentences for
offenses not charged in a single information shall be served consecutively unless the court directs that they be served concurrently.
The purpose of this statute is to prevent a defendant who has been
convicted of crime in more than one court from serving a sentence,
and then claiming he was simultaneously serving the sentence of another court.7 0 If a court imposes a sentence without any knowledge
of an unserved former sentence from a different court, the sentences
will run consecutively, with the imposed sentence beginning at the
expiration of the former. 71
In Franey v. Mayo72 the defendant was sentenced by a criminal
court of record and subsequently for another offense in a circuit court.
The Florida Supreme Court maintained that these were independent
transactions and under the provisions of section 921.16 the sentences
should run consecutively.
Sentences requiring imprisonment to begin at the "expiration of
first sentence," without stating the duration or by what court the first
sentence was imposed, have been held erroneous as vague and indefinite.7 3 The sentence itself, or the record, should be certain so as to
apprise the defendant of the commencement time for each sen74
tence.
Section 921.16 has been held inapplicable to situations in which
the counts in an indictment "present different aspects of a single criminal transaction"75 as distinguished from counts, in an indictment,
charging distinct crimes. In Simmons v. State78 the defendant was
69. FLA. STAT. §921.16 (1961).
70. Franey v. Mayo, 83 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1955).
71. Lindsey v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 465, 14 So. 2d 809 (1943).
72. Supra note 70.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713 (1899).
Lake v. McClelland, 101 Fla. 536, 134 So. 522 (1931).
Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 785, 10 So. 2d 436, 489 (1942).
Ibid.
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convicted and sentenced on one count of assault with intent to commit rape, and on a second count of attempting to have carnal intercourse with an unmarried female under the age of eighteen. On appeal the Florida Supreme Court reversed, maintaining that only one
sentence is permissible in such circumstances, and that "the court
should impose a sentence on the count which charges the higher
grade or degree of the offense."77
Trial Court Modification
Prior to 1961 a trial court's power to modify a sentence was governed by case law. The courts had authority to "modify," "set aside,"
or "reform" a sentence as they thought best,7 8 so long as such action
was taken during the term in which the sentence was imposed.7 9
Two notable exceptions arose regarding the above rule, and exist
today concurrently with legislation. The first is concerned with a defendant who fails to appear for sentencing following a guilty verdict.
Under such circumstances the defendant may be sentenced at any
succeeding term of court when his presence can be procured.80 A second exception occurs when a defendant's request for a deferred sentence is granted and imposition is postponed until a following term.8 '
An illustration of this exception is Smith v. Brown, 2 in which the defendant contracted pneumonia following imposition of a sentence to
six months in the county jail. On advice of his physician the defendant was released and at a later time, after recovery, was sentenced to
two years imprisonment. The Florida court said that the "physician's
representations to the court must be deemed equivalent to a representation by the defendant" and held the greater sentence valid.8 3
In 1961 the legislature passed two statutes which define a court's
power to alter a sentence. 84 Section 921.24 provides that a court may
correct an illegal sentence at any time. This statute ostensibly gives a
court power to hear, during any term, a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by a prisoner on the ground that his sentence is illegal. Section 921.25 provides:
A court may reduce a legal sentence imposed by it in a
criminal case at the same term of court at which it has been
77. Ibid.
78. Lake v. State, 100 Fla. 373, 129 So. 827 (1980); Tillman v. State, 58
Fla. 113, 50 So. 675 (1909).
79. Tucker v. State, 100 Fla. 1440, 131 So. 327 (1930).

80. Ibid.

81. State ex tel. Rhoden v. Chapman, 127 Fla. 9, 172 So. 56 (1937).
82. 135 Fla. 830, 185 So. 732 (1939).
83. Id. at 833, 185 So. at 733.
84. FLA. STAT. §§921.24, .25 (1961).
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imposed, or, if such term ends less than sixty days after the imposition of the sentence, then within sixty days after such imposition ....
The above statute is applicable only to a reduction in sentence and
does not eliminate the two exceptions provided by case decisions.
Appeal
Section 924.06 provides for appeal by a defendant from a sentence on the ground that it is excessive or illegal. Section 924.07 provides for appeal by the state on the ground that the sentence is illegal. These appeals may be taken as a matter of right.8 5 When an
appellate court sustains a sentence on the ground that the sentence is
erroneous, the reversal does not necessitate a new trial, but the case is
merely remanded for proper imposition of sentence.86
When a case is reversed because of an erroneous sentence, the appellate court will often use the following language: "The judgment
and sentence of the court below is hereby reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to impose a proper sentence upon the verdict found." (Emphasis added.) 87 As previously explained, the concepts of judgment and sentence are to be recognized as separate and
distinct. Therefore, it would appear that by reversing the judgment
along with the sentence, a valid judgment is reversed. The effect of
reversing a judgment of guilty is to adjudicate the defendant not
guilty. This is clearly not the purpose of the reversal. A more appropriate manner of expressing the court's decision would eliminate
the word "judgment," merely reversing the sentence.
Disposition of Defendant
Florida Statute 922.01 states that upon pronouncement of a sentence imposing imprisonment, the defendant shall be committed to
the custody of the sheriff, who shall, within a reasonable time, transfer the defendant to the proper authorities. In Sinclair v. State88 the
First District Court of Appeal indicated that this statute would be
strictly construed. In this case the defendant, after being sentenced
by the Circuit Court of Sarasota County, was delivered by the Sarasota County sheriff, not to the place of imprisonment as provided in
the sentence, but to the Manatee County sheriff. The defendant was
85.

FLA. STAT.

§924.05 (1961).

86. Irvin v. State, 52 Fla. 51,41 So. 785 (1906).
87. Id. at 57, 41 So. at 786.
88. 99 So. 2d 238 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
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then brought before the Manatee County Court and sentenced to
serve forty-five days in the Manatee County jail. After completing
this sentence the defendant was transferred to Raiford to begin his
Sarasota sentence. On appeal the court strictly construed section
922.01 and held that the Sarasota sentence commenced to run within
a "reasonable time" after its imposition, that is, the Sarasota sentence
began and ran concurrently with the Manatee sentence. The opinion
stated that a sheriff should not permit a "prisoner to be bandied
about over the State in response to requests from . . . other sheriffs.

. ..

,,

Trial judges should be aware of this decision so that they may observe whether the sheriffs of their jurisdictions strictly comply with
this statute.
Suspension of the Imposition of Sentence
The trial courts of this state have for many years practiced suspending the imposition of sentence when they believed the facts so
warranted. 0 In Carnagio v. State,91 following the adjudication of
guilt the court pronounced: "It is further considered, ordered, and
adjudged that sentence be suspended from day to day and term to
term until the further order of this Court."92 At the succeeding term
of court, sentence was imposed and defendant appealed claiming
that the court lost jurisdiction by not imposing sentence during the
previous term. The court held that "The judgment is not complete
until sentence has been pronounced, and therefore the case is not disposed of until sentence shall have been pronounced: 93
However, an earlier case distinguished between the power of the
court to suspend the imposition of a sentence and the power to suspend the execution of a sentence already imposed. 94 Suspending the
imposition of sentence was recognized, but it was established that
once sentence is imposed the trial court has no power to suspend execution.95
The practice of suspending sentence has occasionally resulted in
great injustice to the defendant. Such injustice occurred in Moutos
v. State,9 6 in which the defendant was adjudged guilty of armed rob89. Id. at 239.
90. Campbell v. State, 131 Fla. 135, 179 So. 137 (1938); Carnagio v. State,
106 Fla. 209, 143 So. 162 (1932).
91. Carnagio v. State, supra note 90.
92. Id. at 210, 143 So. at 163.
93. Id. at 211, 143 So. at 163.
94. Tanner v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203, 45 So. 459 (1907).
95. Id. at 212, 45 So. 462.
96. 49 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1950).
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bery in 1940 and the court deferred the passing of sentence until 1950,
when the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. Despite the flagrant injustice the court upheld the sentence,
thus leading one to conclude that a sentence could be suspended indefinitely and that any later imposition would be held valid.
The court-made practice of indefinite deferment was finally halted
07
by the First District Court of Appeal in the Bateh v. State decision.
The opinion stated that the practice is "inconsistent with the doctrine
which vests the lawmaking authority in the legislative branch of
our government and the power to pardon in the executive."9 8 On
appeal the Florida Supreme Court atffrmed and said that "when a
person is adjudged guilty of an offense the trial judge should . ..
either sentence him or place him on probation." 99 However, both the
First District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court recognized the
trial court's power to temporarily suspend the imposition of sentence.1 00
Since its rendition the Florida courts have followed the Batch decision. In De Loach v. State'"' it was decided that an indefinite deferment of sentence for a period of thirteen days was improper, and
allowed these days to be credited as time served on the sentence.
A more striking example of the injustice remedied by the Bateh doctrine is found in Helton v. State,10 2 in which the defendant was convicted of a crime that carried a maximum sentence of five years. Following an indefinite deferment for twelve years the trial court had
imposed a four-year sentence. The Supreme Court held the sentence
invalid and discharged the defendant stating that if the "trial judge
had performed his duty to place the petitioner under probation at the
time he suspended the imposition of sentence .. ."10 then the maximum period of probation possible would already have been exceeded. Today a trial court either must sentence a defendant or
place him on probation, except in the limited circumstances where a
temporary suspension is permissible.
With the above in mind, Florida Statute 775.14, which places a
time limitation of five years on a sentence which has been "with97. 101 So. 2d 869 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
98. Id. at 872.
99. State v. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7,10 (Fla. 1959).
100. This temporary suspension could be for determining motions or for
the purpose of gaining information necessary for imposing a just sentence.
101. 111 So. 2d 458 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
102. 106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958). This ease was determined subsequent to
Bateh v. State in the First District Court of Appeal, but was prior to its affirmance in the Florida Supreme Court.
103. Id. at 81.
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held following a conviction, should be reviewed. Since the practice
of withholding sentences has been abrogated in Florida, this statute is
made inoperative unless it can be construed as applying to sentences
which have been validly suspended for a temporary purpose. The
practicability of this latter construction is limited and it would avoid
confusion to have this statute repealed.
Indeterminate Sentence

Florida Statutes 921.17-.18 provide for an indeterminate sentence,
permitting a judge to sentence a defendant who has been convicted
of a noncapital felony "for an indeterminate period of 6 months to a
maximum period of imprisonment," which maximum may be less than
that authorized by law for the particular violation. 10 4 Under this
provision the exact period of imprisonment is determined by the parole commission. 105
These above statutes have been subjected to attack on the basis
that they violated the Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights, section 8, which prohibits indefinite imprisonment. 0 6 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statutes and stated that a convicted person
cannot complain because the indeterminate sentence "makes it possible for his imprisonment to be terminated at a time less than the
maximum." 0 7 In this opinion Justice Thornal extoled the virtues of
the indeterminate sentence by maintaining that deterrence and rehabilitation are the results desired by sentencing an individual, and
that these purposes are accomplished when an indeterminate sentence
is imposed. He expressed the belief that such sentencing provides
similar treatment in similar cases and that it provides a "more flexible
opportunity for rehabilitation." 08 In essence, the indeterminate sentence "constantly holds out to the individual law violator the incentive to minimize his term of imprisonment."1 0 9
The availability of an indeterminate sentence is a step forward in
criminal rehabilitation. Rather than stressing the criminal act of an
offender, concern is centered upon the individual that committed the
act" 0 Each criminal is a unique individual, and although "burglary
is always a burglary" not all burglars are alike in motivation, envi104.

FLA. STAT.

§921.18 (1961).

105. F"g. STAT. §921.22 (1961).
106. Caraley v. Cochran, 118 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1960).
107. Id. at 632.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid
110. This is a major thesis of the article by Fox, What Is a Crime?, in this
Symposium.
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